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Abstract:
In this paper two algorithms with the goal of generating the equilibrium set of the power
allocation game first developed in Li and Morse [2017c] are proposed. Based on the first
algorithm, the geometric property of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium set will be proven
to be a collection of convex polytopes. The second, simulation-based, algorithm is developed
to overcome the shortcoming of the first algorithm in terms of generating the equilibrium set
efficiently and then making policy-relevant predictions based on the set. The second algorithm
will be usefully applied to a real-world case study, which draws on the current crisis between
North Korea and certain key players including the US and China.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium computation, total order, best response, constraint satisfaction,
convex polytope
1. INTRODUCTION
A framework of the static power allocation game (abbrevi-
ated as PAG) was first developed in [Li and Morse, 2017c],
where agents simultaneously allocate the total power to
their relations subject to both the total power constraints
and their preferences for the power allocation outcomes
and reach a Nash equilibrium if and only if no one will
strictly benefit in terms of unilateral deviation. This game
was developed to specifically suit the context of strategic
interactions in a networked, adversarial environment. [Li
and Morse, 2017c] presents the proof of the existence of
pure strategy Nash equilibrium for any parametric varia-
tion of the power allocation game.
Obviously, it is the states of the countries predicted by
the equilibria rather than the equilibria themselves that
should be of interest. This is because an infinite number
of equilibria can predict the same combination of states of
all countries; besides, the states provide valuable informa-
tion as to whether a country can survive in equilibrium.
Therefore, in [Li and Morse, 2017c], the idea of equivalence
relations on the set of equilibria U∗ for the game was
introduced. Two equilibria are equivalent if and only if
they yield the same predictions for the entities’ states. In
general, multiple equilibrium equivalence classes exist in
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many parametric variations of the game. The existence
of multiple equilibrium equivalence classes makes a prob-
abilistic prediction of the power allocation outcomes in
different networked international environments necessary.
However, no discussion on finding all possible pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria or the equilibrium equivalence classes
was given yet. The problem considered in this paper is
to execute a search of all possible pure strategy Nash
equilibria and then derive all the equilibrium equivalence
classes by partitioning the set based on the equivalence
relations. Such a predictive study of the power allocation
outcomes in different networked, adversarial environments
is quite necessary. By making predictions for power allo-
cation outcomes for each possible networked environment,
it will help a decision maker to rationally decide the kind
of changes that ought to be made to the environment in
its favor.
The intellectual background for this research problem is
the literature on Nash equilibrium computations. Ever
since Nash’s famous paper in 1950, the issue of Nash
equilibrium computations has traditionally been focused
on the computation of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in
two-player or n-player finite games [Lemke and Howson,
1964]. The main idea is to study the equilibrium compu-
tation problem first as a fix point problem that is easy to
solve, and then continuously transforms it into the actual
problem of interest by “pivoting” to new fix points [Nisan
et al., 2007, McKelvey and McLennan, 1996]. Equilibrium
computations of a similar flavor include the Harsanyi-
Selten adjustment process [Goldberg et al., 2013], though
the adjustment process in [Harsanyi et al., 1988] was orig-
inally developed to suit the problem of equilibrium selec-
tion rather than the problem of equilibrium computations.
Closely related papers on fixed point computations such
as the Scarf’s simplicial subdivision algorithm [Scarf and
Hansen, 1973] include [Herings and Peeters, 2010, Eaves,
1972, Scarf and Hansen, 1973], and a collection of relevant
work is discussed in [Karamardian, 2014].
Existing methods may be not suitable for addressing
this task for two reasons. First, the power allocation
game is an n-player game with an infinite strategy space;
meanwhile, existing methods mostly apply to games with
a finite strategy space. Though a finite-approximation of
the strategy space is possible, it will not be the focus of
this project. Second, by the nature of the power allocation
game itself, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is easier to be
described and more realistic than a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Following a brief review of the power allocation game,
a combinatorial algorithm will be proposed. The input
of the algorithm will be a collection of the parameters
which defines a power allocation game, and the output
of the algorithm will be the set of all possible pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria. The algorithm proceeds by checking
each possible candidate equilibrium equivalence class and
determining its validity. Based on the algorithm, the ge-
ometric property of the equilibria set will be established
to be a collection of convex polytopes. A simulation-based
algorithm for efficiently generating the equilibrium set of
the power allocation game will then be proposed, whose
predictive capability for events will be illustrated with a
case study drawing on one current real world event.
2. THE PAG
2.1 Basic Idea
By the power allocation game or PAG is meant a dis-
tributed resource allocation game between n countries
with labels in n = {1, 2, . . . , n}[Li and Morse, 2017c].
The game is formulated on a simple, undirected, signed
graph G called “an environment graph” [Li et al., 2017]
whose n vertices correspond to the countries and whose m
edges represent relationships between countries. An edge
between distinct vertices i and j, denoted by (i, j), is
labeled with a plus sign if countries i an j are friends and
with a minus sign if countries i and j are adversaries. For
each i ∈ n, Fi and Ai denote the sets of labels of country
i’s friends and adversaries respectively; it is assumed that
i ∈ Fi and that Fi and Ai are disjoint sets. Each country i
possesses a nonnegative quantity pi called the total power
of country i. An allocation of this power or strategy is
a nonnegative n × 1 row vector ui whose j component
uij is that part of pi which country i allocates under the
strategy to either support country j if j ∈ Fi or to demise
country j if j ∈ Ai; accordingly uij = 0 if j 6∈ Fi ∪ Ai
and ui1 + ui2 + · · ·+ uin = pi. The goal of the game is for
each country to choose a strategy which contributes to the
demise of all of its adversaries and to the support of all of
its friends.
Each set of country strategies {ui, i ∈ n} determines an
n× n matrix U whose ith row is ui. Thus U = [uij ]n×n is
a nonnegative matrix such that, for each i ∈ n, ui1+ui2+
· · ·+ uin = pi. Any such matrix is called a strategy matrix
and U is the set of all n× n strategy matrices.
2.2 Multi-front Pursuit of Survival
How countries allocate the power in the support of the sur-
vival of its friends and the demise of that of its adversaries
is studied in [Li et al., 2017] and [Li and Morse, 2017b] in
line with the fundamental assumptions about countries’
behavior in classical international relations theory.[Waltz,
1979] The following additional formulations are offered:
Each strategy matrix U determines for each i ∈ n, the
total support σi(U) of country i and the total threat τi(U)
against country i. Here σi : U → IR and τi : U → IR are
non-negative valued maps defined by U 7−→
∑
j∈Fi
uji +∑
j∈Ai
uij and U 7−→
∑
j∈Ai
uji respectively. Thus coun-
try i’s total support is the sum of the amounts of power
each of country i’s friends allocate to its support plus the
sum of the amounts of power country i allocates to the de-
struction of all of its adversaries. Country i’s total threat,
on the other hand, is the sum of the amounts of power
country i’s adversaries allocate to its destruction. A state
function x : U → X maps a power allocation matrix to a
n vector x(U) (defined as the state vector), where the i-th
element xi(U) is country i’s state, xi(U) = safe if σi(U) >
τi(U), xi(U) = precarious if σi(U) = τi(U), or xi(U) =
unsafe if σi(U) < τi(U). X = {safe, precarious, unsafe}n is
the state space.
In playing the PAG, countries select individual strategies
in accordance with certain weak and/or strong preferences.
A sufficient set of conditions for country i to weakly prefer
strategy matrix V ∈ U over strategy matrix U ∈ U are as
follows
(1) For all j ∈ Fi either xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}, or
xj(U) ∈ {unsafe}, or both.
(2) For all j ∈ Ai either xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious}, or
xj(U) ∈ {safe}, or both.
Weak preference by country i of V over U is denoted by
U i V .
Meanwhile, a sufficient condition for country i to be
indifferent to the choice between V and U is that xi(U) =
xj(V ) for all j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai. This is denoted by V ∼i U .
Finally, a sufficient condition for country i to strongly
prefer V over U is that xi(V ) be a safe or precarious state
and xi(U) be an unsafe state. Strong preference by country
i of V over U is denoted by U ≺i V .
The two sufficient conditions were stated as two axioms in
[Li and Morse, 2017c] and [Li et al., 2017]) and not defi-
nitions per se of the weak preference or strict preference.
They determine a partial order of the power allocation
matrices in U , and the two axioms are consistent. A valid
total order that satisfy the two axioms exists.
The Nash equilibrium concept is naturally employed to
make predictions for the PAG. Let country i’s deviation
from the power allocation matrix U be a nonnegative-
valued 1 × n row vector di ∈ R1×n such that ui + di is
a valid strategy that satisfies the total power constraint
for country i. The deviation set δi is the set of all possible
deviations of country i from the power allocation matrix
U . In the context of a PAG, a power allocation matrix U is
a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if no unilateral deviation
in strategy by any single country i is profitable for i, that
is,
U + eidi  U, for all di ∈ δi,
where ei is an n× 1 unit vector whose elements are 0 but
the i-th coordinate which is 1.
Denote by U∗ the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Call U ∈ U∗ equilibrium equivalent to V ∈ U∗ if and only
if x(U) = x(V ). The relation “equilibrium equivalence” is
an equivalence relation on U∗. Let [U ]∗ be the equilibrium
equivalence class of U ∈ U∗. Obviously, the total number
of equilibrium equivalence classes is at most 3n, which in
turn is the cardinality of the co-domain of x, X .
3. THE ALGORITHM
A combinatorial algorithm is developed in this section
to solve the problem of generating the equilibrium set
U∗ and then the equilibrium classes of the PAG. The
general goal of the algorithm is to derive the algebraic
representations of the equilibrium set by checking whether
the intersections of countries’ best responses under each
possible equilibrium equivalence class defined by the rele-
vant state vector is nonempty within the feasible regions
of the strategy space.
Input of the Algorithm. The input of the algorithm con-
sists of the countries set, n, the total power vector p, the
friend set, the adversary set and the preference order of
each country i,Ai,Fi,4i; i ∈ n which are valid total orders
satisfying the two axioms (see the discussion in Li and
Morse [2017a] and Li et al. [2017]).
Next the algorithm derives three sets of constraints an
equilibrium class must satisfy: each country’s total power
constraints, state constraint, and best response constraint.
Total Power Constraints For each country i, let its total
order of the 3n elements in X of i be
X1 i X2 · · · i Xk <i · · · i X3n .
Given the k-th state vector, Xk, which defines the k-th
candidate equilibrium equivalence class, obtain i’s total
power constraint, Pi(k) defined as the intersection of
constraints (i.e., linear inequalities) for each dimension of
allocation by i that have to hold in equilibrium. These
linear inequalities give the upper and lower bounds for
each dimension of allocation by i for any power allocation
matrix U .
Pi(k) :=
⋂
j∈Fi∪Ai
(uij ≥ 0)
⋂
(
∑
j∈Fi∪Ai
uij = pi)
State Constraints For the k-th candidate equilibrium
equivalence class, obtain each i’s state constraint,
Si(k) :=


(σi(U) > τi(U)) xi(U) = safe
(σi(U) = τi(U)) xi(U) = precarious
(σi(U) < τi(U)) xi(U) = unsafe
defined as the intersections of the constraints for the
allocations in i’s total support σi and total threat τi for
the relevant equilibrium equivalence class to hold.
Best Response Constraints Based on country i’s total
power constraints and the state constraints, now obtain
each country i’s best response constraint. For the k-th best
response constraint Bri(k), it is obtained by intersecting
countries’ relevant state and total power constraints under
the k-th candidate equilibrium equivalence class,
Bri(k) =
⋂
j∈Ai∪Fi
(Sj(k) ∩ Pj(k)).
The the right-hand side of the above equation can be
expanded into a Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) of Ti ≥
0 disjunctive clauses.
CNF(
⋂
j∈Ai∪Fi
Sj(k) ∩ Pj(k)) =
⋂
1≤ti≤Ti
Clauseti .
The ti-th clause (0 ≤ ti ≤ Ti) is said to be a clause for
i’s own allocations under the k-th candidate equilibrium
equivalence class, denoted as Stratti(k), if and only if it
contains only the constraints for allocations by i.
Otherwise, it is said to be a clause for others’ allocations in
the k-th candidate equilibrium equivalence class, denoted
as Condti(k).
It is possible to further expand Stratti(k) or Condti(k),
for instance, expanding each subclause of them into a
(smaller) conjunctive normal form.
A non-deviation condition for
⋂
i∈n Bri(k) has to be sat-
isfied such that for any i ∈ n, i cannot deviate to a
preferred equilibrium equivalence class to the k-th one
by unilaterally changing its strategy. Let
⋂
i∈n Bri(k) that
satisfies the non-deviation condition as
⋂
i∈n Bri(k)
∗.
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium set U∗ is the union of
the intersections of all countries’ best response constraints
for every candidate equilibrium equivalence class,
U∗ :=
⋃
1≤k≤3n
( ⋂
i∈n
Bri(k)
∗
)
.
The output of the algorithm is each equilibrium equiva-
lence class in the algebraic representation. The algebraic
representation is generated with the aim of computing the
volume of the class, which can then used for calculating, for
instance, the likelihood of survival for a given country in
the given power allocation game. (where survival is defined
by being in the state of safe or precarious in Li et al.
[2017].) However, obtaining the algebraic representation
of the classes using the algorithm can be difficult, even
for the simple example in Section 4. This is not surprising
because the problem of generating the equilibrium equiv-
alence classes of the power allocation game is a constraint
satisfaction problem (CSP), which can be be of high com-
plexity.
4. MAIN RESULTS
This section contains a proof of the main result of this
paper, which is that the equilibrium equivalence classes
are geometrically convex polytopes.
Definition 1. (Half-space representation of Convex Polytopes).
A half-space representation of a polytope is P = {x ∈ Rn :
Ax ≤ b}, where A ∈ Rm×n, b ∈ Rm×1, with m,n ∈ Z
(m > n ≥ 1).
Theorem 1. (Strategy Space as Polytope). Given the power
allocation game, the strategy space is a 2m-dimensional
convex polytope, wherem is the number of pairs of distinct
countries who are friends or adversaries.
Proof. Let the set of allocations between any pair of
distinct countries who are friends or adversaries be
{uij : j ∈ Fi∪Ai−{i}, i ∈ n} =
⋃
i∈n
{uij : j ∈ Fi∪Ai−{i}}
whose cardinality is 2m.
Label all allocations in {uij : j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai − {i}, i ∈ n};
the labeling set is z = {1, 2, . . . , 2m}. z =
⋃
i∈n zi, where
zi is the labeling set for the set of i’s allocations in
{uij : j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai − {i}, i ∈ n}.
For each n × n allocation matrix U , a 2m-dimensional
vector uˆ can be constructed such that ∀i, j ∈ n such
that i 6= j, the k-entry, uˆk is equal to the k-allocation
in {uij : j ∈ Fi ∪ Ai − {i}, i ∈ n} (1 ≤ k ≤ 2m), with the
idea being that the total power constraint, the number
of independent nonzero entries in U , i.e., the number
of independent power allocations is 2m. The projection
pi : U 7→ uˆ is bijective. As pi is a bijection, uˆ and U can be
used interchangeably.
Let A = [aij ]n×2m be a real matrix, where the i-th row
vector, ai, is defined such that aiq = 1 if and only if q ∈ zi,
and 0 otherwise. I is an identity matrix, p = [pi]n×1, and
0 = [0]n×1.
The following expression yields both the total power
constraints and the nonnegative requirements for all the
allocations.
P =
{
uˆ ∈ R2m×1 :
[
A
−I
]
uˆ ≤ [ p0 ]
}
.
which is in the half-space representation of the strategy
space.
Therefore, the strategy space of the power allocation game
is a 2m-dimensional convex polytope. 
Theorem 2. (Equilibrium Equivalence Class as Polytope).
Each equilibrium equivalence class of the power allocation
game is a convex polytope with at most 2m dimensions.
The equilibrium set U∗ is a collection of convex polytopes.
Proof. In the algorithm in Section 3, if the non-deviation
condition is not satisfied for the k-th candidate equilibrium
equivalence class, the class will have been ruled out in
the equilibrium set. If it does for the k-th equilibrium
equivalence class,
⋂
i∈n Bri(k)
∗ is a finite intersection of
simple linear inequalities of countries’ allocations for this
class.
Since each linear inequality represents a half-space, each
candidate equilibrium equivalence class is either empty or
a nonempty convex polytope.
Therefore, the equilibrium set U∗ is a union of convex
polytopes. 
Example 1. Consider a simple three-player conflict sce-
nario, where the main parameters of the power allocation
game are the following:
(1) The countries set: n = {1, 2, 3}.
(2) Countries’ power: p = [5 5 9].
(3) The relations: A1 = {2}, A2 = {1, 3}, and A3 = {2}.
F1 = F1 = F1 = ∅.
(4) Each country has a total order of all possible state
vectors as the following:
v1
5− a
v2
9− b − c
v3
5− da
b
c
d
(a) Allocations
With the role of the “precarious” state in countries’
preference orders (as stated in the axioms in Li and Morse
[2017c]), only 2n instead of 3n state vectors need to be
strictly ordered. Accordingly, the following simplications
will be used. For country i, denote country j’s state to be
1 if j is i’s friend and is safe/precarious or j is i’s adversary
and is unsafe/precarious, and to be 0 if and only if j is i’s
friend and is unsafe or j is i’s adversary and is safe. If i and
j have no relations, j’s state is 1 if it is safe/precarious,
and 0 if it is unsafe.
Assume for country 1, its total order of the state vectors
is:
[1, 1, 1] ∼1 [1, 1, 0] 1
[1, 0, 1] ∼1 [1, 0, 0] 1
[0, 1, 0] ∼1 [0, 1, 1] ∼1 [0, 0, 1] ∼1 [0, 0, 0]
Assume for country 2, its total order of the state vectors
is:
[1, 1, 1] ≻2 [0, 1, 1] ≻2 [1, 1, 0] ≻2 [0, 1, 0] ≻2
[1, 0, 1] ≻2 [0, 0, 1] ∼2 [1, 0, 0] ≻2 [0, 0, 0].
Assume for country 3, its total order of the state vectors
is:
[1, 1, 1] ∼3 [0, 1, 1] 3
[1, 0, 1] ∼3 [0, 0, 1] 3
[1, 1, 0] ∼3 [0, 1, 0] ∼3 [1, 0, 0] ∼3 [0, 0, 0].
The nonempty candidate equilibrium equivalence classes
are respectively [0, 0, 1] and [1, 0, 0], represented respec-
tively in conjunctive normal form as
(4 ≤ a)
⋂
(9− a ≤ d)
⋂
(a ≤ 5)
⋂
(b ≤ 4)
⋂
(d ≤ 5)
⋂
(0 ≤ b)
⋂
(5 ≤ c)
⋂
(c ≤ 9− b)
and
(4 ≤ a)
⋂
(9 − a ≤ d)
⋂
(a ≤ 5)
⋂
(b ≤ 9)
⋂
(c ≤ 9− b)
⋂
(0 ≤ c)
⋂
(5 ≤ b)
⋂
(d ≤ 5).
The reason for the existence of the two equilibrium equiv-
alence classes is largely because of the indifference of
country 2 between the state vectors [0, 0, 1] and [1, 0, 0].
Had country 2 preferred a vector over the other, there will
only exist a single equilibrium equivalence class predicted
by the preferred vector.
5. MAKING PREDICTIONS USING SIMULATIONS
The concluding remarks in Section 3 and the example
in Section 4 prompt a study of how to generate the
equilibrium equivalence classes of the power allocation
game efficiently and then use them for making predictions.
This study can be undertaken using simulations, and the
following algorithm is proposed for this purpose. The idea
behind the development of this algorithm is a reformula-
tion of the power allocation game as a updating process
where countries make myopic transitions from one power
allocation matrix to another, where the discretization of
the infinite strategy space is key.
In the sequel the steps of the algorithm will be consecu-
tively explained:
Input of the Algorithm. The input of the algorithm con-
sists of the countries set, n, the total power vector p, the
friend set, the adversary set and the preference order of
each country i, Ai,Fi,4i; i ∈ n.
Initialization. Initialize the equilibrium set to be an
empty set U∗0 = ∅, and an initial power allocation matrice
set U˜ whose cardinality is q > 0 to be a randomly sampled
subset from U .
Update Process By update process is meant that starting
from an initial power allocation matrix, countries update
their own strategies (asynchronously or synchronously) as-
suming the strategies of the others to be fixed to maximize
their utility until a certain number of rounds (T > 0
rounds) or when the countries have reached a Nash equi-
librium. There are q updating processes in total, one for
each initial power allocation matrix in U˜ .
A suitable utility function that satisfies the two preference
axioms can be assumed for countries’ update process
starting from a sampled power allocation matrix. An
example of utility functions that will be used in the
simulations later is
fi(U) =


tii(0) xi(U) = unsafe∑
j∈F1
i
∪A1
i
tij(1) xi(U) ∈ {safe, precarious}
where tij(0) or tij(1) are defined to be i’s pairwise utilities
from the relation with j depending on whether j is a friend
or an adversary as well as j’s state predicted by U (Li and
Morse [2017a]).
For instance, tii(0) is both the total utility of i and the
pairwise utility from itself when it has not survived (which
can be simplified to be 0); tii(1) > 0 is its pairwise
utility from itself when it has. F1i denotes the set of i’s
friends who are safe/precarious, and A1i denotes the set
of i’s adversaries who are unsafe/precarious. The pairwise
utilities are also a proxy of countries’ relation importance
with every friend and adversary.
Starting from the h-th (0 ≤ h ≤ q) initial power allocation
matrix, U(0), Country i at step t of the updating process
adjusts its own strategy to maximize its utility assuming
the strategies of others to be fixed.
ui(t) = argmaxui(t)fi(u1(t− 1), . . . , ui(t), . . . , un(t− 1)).
Store U(T ) or the equilibrium U∗ into the equilibrium set
U∗h−1,
U∗h = U
∗(h− 1) ∪ U(T ) or U∗h = U
∗
h−1 ∪ U
∗.
(When T is large enough, U(T ) still provides insightful
information about countries’ power allocation even if it
might not be an equilibrium.)
Go to the (h+1)-th initial power allocation matrix. Start
the updating process starting from this new matrix. At
the end of the q-th updating process, the equilibrium set
U∗q is generated.
Generate Equilibrium Equivalence Classes Partition the
equilibrium set into equilibrium equivalence classes. The
cardinalities of each equilibrium equivalence class can then
be used for calculating the likelihood for each class.
Case Study: North Korea-China-US in 2017-2018 The
execution of this algorithm will obviously use simulations.
The current Nuclear crisis that involves the United States
(1), China (2), Japan (3), South Korea (4), Russia (5) and
North Korea (6) is examined.
The steps of the simulations are as follows. First, obtain
the power indices of these countries, for which the “com-
posite index for nations’ capabilities”(Singer et al. [1972])
will be used. As of 2012, these six countries’ CINC indices
are:
[0.139, 0.218, 0.035, 0.023, 0.040, 0.013],
which will be used next. Second, randomize the symmetric
relations among these countries into “friend” (1), “ad-
versary” (-1), or “null” (0) and the relation importances
between 0 and 1. (The importances for “null” relations
are by default 0.) Third, for each power allocation game
assuming each relation configuration, compute the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium set (where 10,000 initial power
allocation matrices will be sampled). The previous utility
function is to be used, where the sampled relation im-
portances of each country i become its pairwise utilities
tij(1), j ∈ n; in addition, tii(0) = 0. For simplicity, the
relation importances between i and j are assumed to be
symmetric in this paper. Lastly, compare the likelihood of
survival for each country across different cases.
First Country Second Country Relation Type Relation Importance
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
3 3 1 1
4 4 1 1
5 5 1 1
6 6 1 1
1 2 -1 0.3016625
1 3 -1 0.2175963
1 4 1 0.2161213
1 5 0 0
1 6 1 0.3415068
2 3 1 0.3632781
2 4 0 0
2 5 0 0
2 6 -1 0.1707308
3 4 0 0.2319436
3 5 1 0.1440208
3 6 0 0
4 5 0 0
4 6 -1 0.1355878
5 6 -1 0.2719213
In the first case, the likelihoods of each of the six coun-
tries’ survival (characterized by the percentage of the
matrices in U∗q predicting the country’s survival) are:
[100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99.71%]. But in most of
these cases, most of the countries are in the precarious
states. The likelihoods of the six countries’ being safe (not
precarious) are:
[0% 98.5% 6.18% 30.54% 81.63% 0%].
First Country Second Country Relation Type Relation Importance
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
3 3 1 1
4 4 1 1
5 5 1 1
6 6 1 1
1 2 -1 0.180719673
1 3 0 0
1 4 1 0.174140854
1 5 1 0.474582374
1 6 0 0
2 3 -1 0.164999116
2 4 -1 0.43771212
2 5 -1 0.158066073
2 6 -1 0.137276616
3 4 -1 0.277800827
3 5 0 0
3 6 -1 0.154644001
4 5 0 0
4 6 1 0.485971539
5 6 0 0
In the second case, the likelihoods of each of the six
countries’ survival are:
[100% 100% 96.26% 97.63% 100% 88.29%].
The likelihoods of the six countries’ being safe (not pre-
carious) are:
[8.09% 54.07% 9.39% 0% 30.92% 6.26%].
6. CONCLUSION
This paper examines how to make real world predictions
based on the pure strategy Nash equilibrium set of the
power allocation game, where the key task is to generate
the equilibrium set efficiently. Both methods of a more
analytical flavor and simulations are discussed.
In future work, it should be promising to perform more
predictions of countries’ power allocation outcomes assum-
ing different networked international environments using
simulations for scenarios that have or have not taken
place. The predictions will hopefully be a basis for further
insights on possible kinds of changes to the environment
that could shift the then situation in a country’s own favor.
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